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Abstract 
These days cyber-attack is a serious criminal offense and it is a hot debated issue 
moreover. A man-in-the-middle-attack is a kind of cyberattack where an unapproved 
outsider enters into an online correspondence between two users, remains escaped the 
two parties. The malware that is in the middle-attack often monitors and changes 
individual/classified information that was just realized by the two users. A man-in-the-
middle-attack as a protocol is subjected to an outsider inside the system, which can 
access, read and change secret information without keeping any tress of manipulation. 
This issue is intense, and most of the cryptographic systems without having a decent 
authentication security are threatened to be hacked by the malware named ‘men-in-the-
middle-attack’ (MITM/MIM). This paper essentially includes the view of understanding 
the term of ‘men-in-the-middle-attack’; the current work is mainly emphasized to 
accumulate related data/information in a single article so that it can be a reference to 
conduct research further on this topic at college/undergraduate level. This paper 
likewise audits most cited research and survey articles on ‘man-in-the-middle-attack’ 
recorded on 'Google Scholar'. The motivation behind this paper is to help the readers 
for understanding and familiarizing the topic 'man-in-the-middle attack'. 
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1. Introduction 
In cryptography and PC security, a man-in-the-middle attack (MITM) is an attack 
where the attacker furtively transfers and perhaps changes the correspondence between 
two parties who trust they are straightforwardly communicating with each other. A man 
in the middle (MITM) attack is a general term for when a culprit positions himself in a 
discussion between a client and an application; either to listen stealthily or to imitate one 
of the parties, making it show up as though an ordinary trade of information is in progress 
(U. Meyer and S. Wetzel, 2004 [1]; L. B. Kish, 2006 [2]; K. Hypponen and K. M. Haataja, 
2007 [3]; K. Ouafi et al. 2008 [4]). The objective of an attack is to take individual 
information, for example, login certifications, account points of interest and charge card 
numbers. Targets are normally the clients of financial applications, SaaS businesses, web-
based business locales and other sites where logging in is required. Information obtained 
during an attack could be utilized for many, purposes, including fraud, unapproved 
support exchanges or an unlawful watchword change. Furthermore, it can be utilized to 
gain a decent footing inside an anchored edge during the infiltration phase of an Advanced 
Persistent Threat (APT) strike. Figure-01 portrays a schematic of 'men-in-the-middle-
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attack' belief system. A man-in-the-middle attack allows a malicious actor to intercept, 
send and receive data meant for someone else, or not meant to be sent at all, without either 
outside party knowing until it is too late. Man-in-the-middle attacks can be abbreviated 
in many ways, including MITM, MitM, MiM or MIM (K. Ouafi et al., 2008 [4]; Y. Joshi 
et al., 2009 [6]; A. S. Khader and D. Lai, 2016 [9]; Y.C. Tung et al., 2016 [10]; B. M. 
Wallace and J. W. Miller, 2017 [11]; M. Conti et al., 2016 [12]) 
 
Figure 1. Men-in-the-middle attack ideology schematic 
One case of man-in-the-middle attacks is dynamic eavesdropping, in which the attacker 
makes independent associations with the victims and transfers messages between them to 
influence them to trust they are talking straightforwardly to each other over a private 
association when in certainty the whole discussion is controlled by the attacker. The attacker 
must have the capacity to intercept every single significant message passing between the two 
casualties and inject new ones. This is direct in many conditions; for instance, an attacker 
within gathering scope of an unencrypted wireless access point (Wi-Fi) could insert himself as 
a man-in-the-middle (F. Callegati et al., 2009 [5]; Y. Desmedt, 2011 [7]). As an attack that 
goes for circumventing common authentication, or scarcity in that department, a man-in-the-
middle attack can succeed just when the attacker can mimic every endpoint agreeable to them 
not surprisingly from the genuine closures. Comprehensively speaking, a MITM attack is what 
might as well be called a mailman opening your bank proclamation, writing down your record 
points of interest and after that resealing the envelope and delivering it to your entryway. Most 
cryptographic conventions include some type of endpoint authentication particularly to persist 
MITM attacks. For instance, TLS can authenticate one or the two parties using a commonly 
confided in endorsement expert (D. Sounthiraraj et al., 2014 [8]; A. S. Khader and D. Lai, 2015 
[9]; R. Rahim, 2017 [14]). 
2.  Literature Survey 
MITM is named for a ball game where two people play catch while a third person in the middle 
attempts to intercept the ball. MITM is also known as a fire brigade attack, a term derived from the 
emergency process of passing water buckets to put out a fire. In the year 2004, U. Meyer and S. 
Wetzel presented a report on Universal Mobile Telecommunication System’s (UITM) security 
protocol where they discussed about ‘men-in-the-middle-attack’ on mobile communication (U. 
Meyer and S. Wetzel, 2004 [1]). In 2006, L. B. Kish published his research in a master listed journal 
where he showed an encryption method of MITM using Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson (-like)-noise cipher 
(L. B. Kish, 2006 [2]). K. Hypponen and K. M. J. Haataja (2007), made a research on secure 
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Bluetooth communication and showed their developed system was capable of preventing MITM 
attack (K. Hypponen and K. M. Haataja, 2007 [3]).  D. Sun et al., 2018 and S. Saif et al., 2018; made 
similar type of researches on updated version of Bluetooth networks security and discussed about 
new techniques to prevent MITM in two party’s communication (D. Z. Sun et al., 2018 [17]; S. Saif 
et al., 2018 [21]). K. Ouafi et al., 2008, F. Callegati et al., 2009, Y. Joshi et al., 2009, Y. Desmedt, 
2011 and D. Sounthiraraj et al., 2014 conducted researches about HTTP security and those researches 
found MITM as a very serious threat and those also discussed about the prevention techniques (K. 
Ouafi et al., 2008 [4]; F. Callegati et al., 2009 [5]; Y. Joshi et al., 2009 [6]; Y. Desmedt, 2011 [7]; D. 
Sounthiraraj et al., 2014 [8]). A. S. Khader et al. 2015 and Y. Tung et al. 2016 published their 
researches which mostly talks about different prevention methods of MITM (A. S. Khader & D. Lai, 
2015 [9]; Y. Tung et al., 2016 [10]).  B. J. Wallace and J. W. Miller patented their research about 
endpoint based MITM where they tested multiple prevention methods for MITM (B. M. Wallace & 
J. W. Miller, 2017 [11]). M. Conti et al., 2016; did a survey on MITM and its effects on the economy 
(M. Conti et al., 2016 [12]). X. Li et al., 2017; R. Rahim, 2017; C. Howell et al., 2018 made identical 
researches on prevention of MITM mainly for internet communication and those papers discusses 
several unique and effective measures on prevention of MITM from on-net communication (X. Li et 
al., 2017 [13]; R. Rahim, 2017 [14]; C. Howell et al., 2018 [16]). Y. Fei et al., 2017; K. Usman et al., 
2018; M. R. Valluri, 2018 and E. Kuo et al. 2018 published their review reports on MITM which 
mostly discusses about WLAN security for 2-way communication. 
3. Progression of ‘Man-In-The-Middle-Attack’ 
Effective MITM execution has two distinct stages: interception and decryption; which 
involves being within physical closeness to the intended target, and another that exclusive 
involves malware, known as a man-in-the-browser (MITB) attack. With a conventional MITM 
attack, the attacker needs access to an unsecured, or ineffectively anchored Wi-Fi switch (X. 
Li et al., 2017 [13]; R. Rahim, 2017 [14]; Y. Y. Fei et al., 2018 [15]; C. Howell et al., 2018 
[16]; D. Z. Sun et al., 2018 [17]). These sorts of associations are by and large found out in the 
open territories with free Wi-Fi hotspots, and even in a few people's homes. An attacker will 
check the switch using code looking for particular shortcomings, for example, default or poor 
secret key utilize, or security gaps because of the poor arrangement of the switch. Once the 
attacker has discovered the powerlessness, they will then insert their instruments in the middle 
of the clients' PC and the sites the client visits. A fresher variation of this attack has been 
gaining fame with cybercriminals because of its simplicity of execution. With a man-in-the-
browser attack, every one of an attacker needs are an approach to inject malware into the PC, 
which will then install itself into the browser without the clients' learning and will then record 
the information that is being sent between the victim and particular focused on sites, for 
example, financial institutions, that are coded into the malware. Once the malware has gathered 
the particular information it was modified to gather, it then transmits that information back to 
the attacker. 
3.1 Interception 
The initial step intercepts client activity through the attacker's system before it achieves its 
intended destination. The most well-known (and easiest) method for doing this is an inactive 
attack in which an attacker makes free/open wifi hotspots; accessible to general society. 
Commonly named in a way that relates to their area, they aren't watchword secured. Once a 
casualty interfaces with such a hotspot, the attacker gains full permeability to any online 
information trade. Attackers wishing to adopt a more dynamic strategy to interception may 
dispatch one of the following attacks:  
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•    IP spoofing involves an attacker disguising himself as an application by altering parcel 
headers in an ip address. Accordingly, clients attempting to get to a url associated with the 
application are sent to the attacker's site (‘man in the middle (mitm) attack’ (incapsula co.), 
2016 [22]) 
•    ARP spoofing is the way toward linking an attacker's mac address with the ip address of 
a legitimate user on a local area network using fake ARP messages. Subsequently, information 
sent by the client to the host ip deliver is instead transmitted to the attacker (U. Meyer And S. 
Wetzel, 2004 [1]; I. B. Kish, 2006 [2]; K. Hypponen and K. M. Haataja, 2007 [3]; K. Ouafi et 
al., 2008 [4]; F. Callegati et al., 2009 [5]; Y. Joshi et al., 2009 [6]; Y. Desmedt, 2011 [7])  
•    DNS spoofing, otherwise called DNS store poisoning, involves infiltrating a DNS server 
and altering a site's address record. Accordingly, clients attempting to get to the site are sent 
by the adjusted dns record to the attacker's site (K. Ouafi et al., 2008 [4]; Y. Joshi et al., 2009 
[6]; Khader et al., 2015 [9]; C. Howell et al., 2018 [16]; D. Z. Sun et al., 2018 [17]; K. Usman 
et al., 2018 [18]; M. R. Valluri, 2018 [19]; C. Kuo et al., 2018 [20]; S. Saif et al., 2018 [21]; 
‘man in the middle (mitm) attack’ (incapsula co.), 2016 [22]). 
3.2. Decryption  
After an interception, any two-way SSL movement should be unscrambled without 
alerting the client or application. Various strategies exist to accomplish this:  
•    HTTPS spoofing sends an imposter endorsement to the victim's browser once the initial 
association demand for a safe site is made (‘Man-in-the-middle attack’ (Wikipedia) [23]). It 
holds an advanced thumbprint related with the bargained application, which the browser 
confirms according to an existing rundown of confided in destinations. The attacker is then 
ready to get to any information entered by the casualty before it's passed to the application.  
•    SSL BEAST (browser abuse against SSL/TLS) focuses on a TLS variant 1.0 helplessness 
in SSL. Here, the casualty's PC is infected with pernicious JavaScript that intercepts scrambled 
treats sent by a web application. Then the application's figure square chaining (CBC) is 
endangered in order to decode its treats and authentication tokens (‘man-in-the-middle-attack-
mitm’ (Techpedia) [25]; “man-in-the-middle-attack” (Rapid Web Ser.) [26]; ‘What is a Man 
In The Middle attack?’ (Symantec Corp.) [27], Norton Security Blog- ‘What is UMTS?’ (Tech 
Target Web), Blog Post [28])  
•    SSL hijacking happens when an attacker passes produced authentication keys to both 
the client and application during a TCP handshake. This sets up what seems, by all accounts, 
to be a safe association when, actually, the man in the middle controls the whole session (K. 
Ouafi et al., 2008 [4]; Y. Desmedt, 2011 [7]; ‘Man-in-the-middle attack’ (Wikipedia) [23]; 
‘Flaw in Windows DNS client exposed millions of users to hacking’ (SC Mag. UK), News 
Article [29])  
•    SSL stripping minimizes an HTTPS association with HTTP by intercepting the TLS 
authentication sent from the application to the client. The attacker sends a decoded form of the 
application's site to the client while maintaining the anchored session with the application. In 
the meantime, the client's whole session is noticeable to the attacker (M. Conti et al., 2016 [12]; 
X. Li et al., 2017 [13]; R. Rahim, 2017 [14]; Y. Y. Fei et al., 2018 [15]; C. Howell et al., 2018 
[16]; D. Z. Sun et al., 2018 [17]; K. Usman et al., 2018 [18]; M. R. Valluri, 2018 [19]) 
4. MITM: What and How? 
‘Man-in-the-middle-attack’ also known/abbreviated as MIM, MiM, MitM or MITMA is a 
type of cryptographic attack over a communication channel by a malicious third party where 
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he/she takes over a confidential/personal communication channel between two or legitimate 
communicative points or parties. In this cyber-attack, the attacker can control (read, modify, 
intercept, change or replace) the communication traffic between victims. But by using MITM 
protocol the unauthenticated attacker leaves no clues/traces of his interception of this 
cybercrime, in short words the attacker remains invisible to the victims. 
It needs a communication channel to make a MITM attack. The most used communication 
channels of MITM attack are namely GSM, UMTS, Long-Term Evolution (LTE), Bluetooth, 
Near Field Communication (NFC), Radio Frequency and Wi-Fi. The first recorded MITM 
attack was planned in the time of WW-II for intercepting German Military’s radio 
communication and was done by the Royal British Intelligence (also known as MI-6) (W. 
Kozaczuk, 1984 [31]). In normal sense, there are three most possible compromises, namely 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability; which is aimed at my MITM attack. Most of the 
MITM attacks now days are done in social media, because of the extensive use of human 
communication are done using social media (Facebook, Twitter, Yahoo Messenger and etc. (A. 
A. Z. Hudaib, 2014 [32]) Decoding a MITM attack is a long process, basically this is done 
using three ways, namely 1) Based on impersonation methods of cyber decoding, 2) Based on 
Telecommunication addressing techniques and lastly 3) Based on GPS locating method of 
attacker and victims both (M. Conti et al., 2016 [33]). 
5. Present Status of MITM Attacks 
Nowadays, most of the MITM attacks are performed using communication layers. Open 
System Intercommunication (OSI) and GSM networks are the most affected communication 
channels by MITM attacks. Table-1 shows types of MITM attacks on different OSI and 
Cellular service networks (‘Man-in-the-middle attack’ (Wikipedia) [23]; ‘man-middle-attack’ 
(CA Tech) [24]; ‘man-in-the-middle-attack-mitm’ (Techpedia) [25]; “man-in-the-middle-
attack” (Rapid Web Ser.) [26]; ‘What is a Man In The Middle attack?’ (Symantec Corp.), 
Norton Security Blog) [27]; ‘What is UMTS?’ (Tech Target Web), Blog Post [28]; ‘Flaw in 
Windows DNS client exposed millions of users to hacking’ (SC Mag. UK), News Article [29]; 
A. Fatima, 2011 [30]; W. Kozaczuk, 1984 [31]; A. A. Z. Hudaib, 2014 [32]; M. Conti et al., 
2016 [33]). 
Table-1: MITM attacks on different communication channels
 
In Table-1, we list MITM attacks across OSI layers and cellular networks. Each layer 
enforces different approaches to provide security. Nevertheless, neither of them is free from 
MITM attacks. Ornaghi et al. 2003, at a European conference, was the first to present a security 
system-based tracking location of the attacker and victim (Ornaghi et al., 2003 [34]). He 
classified MITM attacks in three distinct categories: a) LAN (Local Area Network) tracking, 
b) LAN to Remote Network tracking and c) Remote Network track. The authors also take into 
consideration that STP mangling is a closed type of MITM as the attacker can only manage to 
decode the unmanaged traffic between two clients. 
MITM Types 
OSI Layers Data Links ARP spoofing type 
Presentation SSL decryption, CA decryption 
Transport and Networking IP spoofing 
Applications DHCP spoofing, BGP type, DNS 
spoofing 
Cellular Networks GSM  
FBS type UTMS 
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5.1. Spoofing: Most Common MITM 
Spoofing an impersonation technique which is originated from ‘spying’. In the middle 
century, European spies used to hear secret conversation by impersonating him/her to the 
communicative party. The same method is applied in modern cryptographic spoofing, as the 
attacker intercepts a confidential/personal communication between two hosts and controls over 
transferring data, while the hosts are not being aware of the unauthenticated attacker. Some 
research papers (‘Flaw in Windows DNS client exposed millions of users to hacking’ (SC Mag. 
UK), News Article [18]; ‘What is UMTS?’ (Tech Target Web), Blog Post) [19]; ‘What is a 
Man in The Middle attack?’ (Symantec Corp.), Norton Security Blog [20]; “man-in-the-
middle-attack” (Rapid Web Ser.), Blog Post [21]; ‘man-in-the-middle-attack-mitm’ 
(Techpedia) [22]; ‘man-middle-attack’ (CA Tech.) [23]; ‘Man-in-the-middle attack’ 
(Wikipedia) [24]; ‘MAN IN THE MIDDLE (MITM) ATTACK’ (Incapsula Co.) [25]; S. Saif 
et al., 2018 [26]; E. C. Kuo et al., 2018 [27]; M. R. Valluri, 2018 [28]; K. Usman et al., 2018 
[29]; D. Senie and P. Ferguson, 1998 [35]; T. E. Humphreys et al., 2008 [36]; L. Scott, 2001 
[37]; S. A. Schuckers, 2002 [38]) describe spoofing as the first step of executing MITM, not 
being the total of a MITM attack; while some other deliciated research papers claim spoofing 
as a whole MITM process. In this paper, we will consider it as a spoofing based MITM or 
spoofing attack. When a party wants to communicate with other parties over a cryptographic 
network then if their network is same with an unknown MAC address then the server broadcasts 
an address resolution protocol (also abbreviated as ARP) request to all hosts under the same 
network connection. The client with the announced Internet Protocol is only expected to make 
a reply including his/her MAC (Media Access Control) address. However, when ARP cache is 
managed in a dynamic mode, cache entries can be easily fabricated by forged ARP messages, 
since proper authentication mechanism is missing (M. Oh et al., 2012 [39]). In the meantime, 
the communicating medium saves the IP to MAC entry in its local cache, so the next time 
communication can be speeded up, by avoiding the broadcasts. 
Address Resolution Protocol has no states thus it provides very few securities to the caching 
system. Some top-notch researches referring from M. Ataullah and N. Chauhan, 2012 [40]; H. 
Altunbasak et al., 2004 [41]; S. Subashini and V. Kavitha, 2011 [42]; S. Alabady, 2009 [43]; 
R. Caceres and V. N. Padmanabhan, 1998 [44]; M. Ford, 2005 [45]; D. Pansa and T. Chomsiri, 
2008 [46]; T. Chomsiri, 2008 [47]; H. Salim et al., 2012 [48]; T. Demuth and A. Leitner, 2005 
[49] shows the state-of-art (SoA) of using those security weaknesses for conducting a perfect 
MITM attack. Suppose, we have next network: the attacker ‘X’ (IP = 10.0.x.x3, MAC = 
EE:EE:EE:EE:EE:X3), victim ‘A’ (IP = 10.0.x.x1, MAC = AA:AA:AA:AA:AA:X1), and 
victim ‘B’ (IP = 10.0.x.x2, MAC = BB:BB:BB:BB:BB:X2). The next steps for a perfect 
spoofing based on ARP are shown below: 
 
1)‘X’ sends an ARP Reply message to ‘A’, which says that IP: 10.0.x.x3 has MAC address: 
EE:EE:EE:EE:EE:X3. This message will update ‘A’’s ARP table. 
2)‘X’ also sends an ARP Reply message to ‘B’, which says that IP: 10.0.x.x2 has MAC address: 
EE:EE:EE:EE:EE:X3. This message will update ‘B’’s ARP table. 
3)When ‘A’ wants to send a message to ‘B’, it will go to ‘X’’s MAC address 
EE:EE:EE:EE:EE:X3, instead of ‘B’’s BB:BB:BB:BB:BB:X2. 
4) When ‘B’ wants to send a message to ‘A’, it will also go to ‘X’. 
 
Schematic regarding the example stated above is given in Figure-2.
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Figure-2: Spoofing method between two clients 
 
There are many well-researched works of literature where spoofing defending system is 
discussed. Among them T. Demuth et al., 2005, D. Pansa et al., 2008, Z. Trabelsi et al., 2007 
and R. Philip et al., 2007 are mostly considerable (D. Pansa and T. Chomsiri, 2008 [49]; T. 
Demuth and A. Leitner, 2005 [46]; Z. Trabelsi and W. El-Hajj, 2007 [50]; R. Philip et al., 2007 
[51]). They introduced various well-researched techniques to prevent spoofing and make 
secure communication over LAN. But those Literature doesn’t concern about wireless methods 
of communications. The Table-2 below shows a typical comparison between spoofing 
prevention techniques:
Table-2: Comparison of various types of spoofing prevention technologies 
 
References Medium of 
Communication 
Protocol Concerns 
T. Demuth et al., 2005 [49] Server Based 
Communication 
ARP Can’t work for wireless 
communications. 
D. Pansa et al., 2008 [46] Server Based/ Host Based ARP, DHCP Compatible for DoS, 
DHCP but has a single 
point of failure. 
Z. Trabelsi et al., 2007 [50] Host Based ARP Level of importance of 
each host is very difficult 
to decide. 
R. Philip et al., 2007 [51] Host Based ARP Works only with Linksys 
routers. Static IP not 
supported. 
M. Oh et al., 2012 [52] Cryptographic/ Host Based UDP/ ARP For UDP, authentication 
is a must need. 
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Komori et al., 2002 [53] SYMMETRIC/PRIVATE-
KEY 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 
DHCP Legitimate hosts must 
register in advance, adds 
additional message flow, 
hard to manage for large 
number of hosts. 
Ju et al., 2007 [54] SYMMETRIC/PRIVATE-
KEY 
CRYPTOGRAPHY, RFC 
DCHP, DHCP The authors did not 
describe how the random 
value (the number, which 
used by the server and 
client to compute the 
session key) is 
determined. 
Z. Duan et al., 2006 [55] Router Based IP, ARP Filtering-on-path method 
can’t ensure a secure 
communication. 
D. G. Andersen et al., 2008 
[56] 
Router/ Host Based IP, DHCP This system is considered 
as the highest secured 
communication. But not 
so user friendly. 
  
6. MITM On GSM: A Threat to Phone Communication Security 
In the early 90’s, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute introduced GSM as 
a second generation (2G) telecommunication standard. Today, according to the mobility report 
(SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS SUSTAINABILITY REPORT [57]), GSM covers more than 
90% of the world population. There are two basic types of services offered through GSM: 
telephony and data bearer. The GSM architecture consists of Mobile Stations (MSs) and Base 
Terminal Stations (BTS), which communicate with each other through radio links. Each BTS 
connects to the Base Station Controller (BSC). BSC links to the Mobile Switching Center 
(MSC), which is responsible for routing signals to and from fixed networks (Z. Su et al., 2018 
[58]). Home Location Register (HLR) and the Visitor Location Register (VLR) are the two 
major databases for each mobile service provider in the GSM architecture. Figure-3 shows a 
schematic of GSM architecture. Each of GSM subscribers has the secret key, which is stored 
in the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card of the MS. The Authentication Center (AUC) 
has a secret key, which is shared with the subscriber and AUC. AUC generates a set of security 
parameters for execution of encryption and authentication. 
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Figure-3: GSM Architecture (J. F. Kurose, 2005 [114]) 
The main idea behind the attack is to impersonate same mobile network code as the 
legitimate GSM network to false BTS (or IMSI Cather (N. V. Hardin, 2018 [59]) and convince 
the victim that this station is the valid one. Let us consider the next example: network consists 
of the Legitimate MS, Legitimate BTS, False BTS, and False MS. Attacker’s network is a 
combination of the False BTS and False MS. While in standby mode the MS connects to the 
best received BTS. Therefore, False BTS should be more powerful than the original one, or 
closer to the target. If the victim is already connected, then the attacker requires to drawn any 
present real stations. The algorithm of the FBS-based MITM attack on GSM is the following: 
1) Attacker sets-up connection between False BTS and Legitimate MS. 
2) False MS impersonates the victim’s MS to the real network by resending the identity 
information, which was received from the step 1. 
3) Victim’s MS sends its authentication information and cipher-suites to the False BTS. 
4) Attacker forwards message from step 3 to the Legitimate BTS, with changed 
authentication abilities of the MS to do not support encryption (A5/0 algorithm (Su X. 
et al. 2018 [60]), or to weak encryption algorithm (e.g., A5/2). 
5) Legitimate MS and Legitimate BTS exchange authentication challenge (RAND), and 
authentication response (SRES), attacker forwards them. 
Figure-4 below shows a graphical representation of the example stated above.
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Figure-4: MITM in GSM network 
Finally, the authentication is finished. All following messages between the victim and real 
network are going through attacker’s entities, with encryption specified by an attacker, or no 
encryption at all. This manipulation is possible since GSM does not provide the data integrity 
(Z. Chen et al., 2007 [61]), as a result, the attacker can catch, modify, and resend messages. 
At the designing phase of the GSM protocol, FBS seemed impractical due to costly required 
equipment, but currently, this kind of attack is completely applicable since costs decreased (B. 
Feher et al., 2018 [62]). Paik et. al., 2010 (Paik et. al., 2010 [63]); besides describing GSM 
security concerns, pointed out that nowadays attackers are better equipped. Among the reasons 
we can identify opensource projects (e.g., Open BTS (D. A. Burgess and H. S. Samra, 2008 
[64])) and low-cost hardware (e.g., Ettus Research (A. N. I. C. Ettus Research. Ettus research 
- the leader in software-defined radio (SDR) [65])). In particular, an attacker can build its own 
false BTS for less than $1000. An algorithm of FBD based MITM attack on GSM network is 
given below in Figure-5. 
 
Figure-5: MITM on GSM network via FBS method 
The Table-3 discusses various FBS based MITM attacks prevention approaches and 
different attacks with regarding references. 
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Table-3: FBS based MITM attacks preventions 
Preventions H. H. Ou et 
al., 2010 [66] 
Y. L. Huang et 
al., 2011 [67] 
T. Hwang et 
al., 2014 [68] 
N. Saxena 
and N. S. 
Chaudhari, 
2014 [69] 
N. Saxena and 
N. S. 
Chaudhari, 
2014 [70] 
MITM attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Replay attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Active attack in 
unauthorized 
network 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Redirection Yes Yes Yes Yes Partially 
DoS attack No Partially Yes No Yes 
 
7. Statistical Analysis of MITM Attack 
For statistical analysis of the MiM attacks, we refer to the usual finite lattice of security 
levels, (𝒮, ⊑𝒮 , ⨅𝒮 , ⨆𝒮 ,⊺𝒮 , ⊥𝒮) and based on it define 𝜁: ℕ → 𝒮 as a mapping from names to their 
security levels. Now, we can define the name integrity property as follows. 
Property [Name integrity] 
We say that a name, 𝑥, has the integrity property with respect to a 𝜙𝐴 environment if  
∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑜𝑓(𝜙𝐴(𝑥)): 𝜁(𝑥) ⊑ 𝜁(𝑛) 
The predicate integrity (𝑥, 𝜙𝐴) indicates that 𝑥 upholds the above property with respect to 
𝜙𝐴. A MITM attack is defined as an attack in which the intruder is capable of breaching the 
integrity of names of two processes. 
Property [Man-in-the-Middle Attack] 
A context, 𝐶 (a process with a hole) succeeds in launching a MiM attack on two processes, 
𝑃 and 𝑄, if the result of the abstract interpretation, 𝐴(|𝐶(𝑃|𝑄|){||} ⊥𝐷⊥= 𝜙𝐴 proves that∃𝑥∈
𝑏𝑛(𝑃), 𝑦 ∈ 𝑏𝑛(𝑄): ¬(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑥, 𝜙𝐴) ⋁ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑦, 𝜙𝐴)). 
8. Preveenting ‘MITM’ 
Blocking MITM attacks requires a few down to earth ventures with respect to clients, and 
additionally a combination of encryption and check techniques for applications. For clients, 
this implies:  
•    Avoiding WiFi associations that aren't password encrypted.  
•    Paying consideration regarding browser warnings reporting a site as being unsecured.  
•    Immediately logging out of a protected application when it's not in utilize.  
•    Not using open systems (e.g., cafés, lodgings) when conducting sensitive financial 
exchanges.  
For site administrators, secure correspondence conventions, including TLS and HTTPS, 
help relieve spoofing attacks by vigorously encrypting and authenticating transmitted 
information (A. Fatima, 2011 [30]). Doing so keeps the interception of site activity and hinders 
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the decoding of delicate information, for example, authentication tokens. It is viewed as best 
practice for applications to utilize SSL/TLS to anchor each page of their site and not only the 
pages that expect clients to sign in. Doing so helps diminishes the possibility of an attacker 
stealing session treats from a client browsing on an unsecured segment of a site while signed 
in. 
To counter MITM, Antivirus frameworks furnishes its clients with a streamlined end-to-
end SSL/TLS encryption, as a component of its suite of security administrations (‘Man-in-the-
middle attack’ (Wikipedia) [23]; ‘man-middle-attack’ (CA Tech.) [24]; ‘man-in-the-middle-
attack-mitm’ (Techpedia) [25]; “man-in-the-middle-attack” (Rapid Web Ser.), Blog Post [26]; 
‘What is a Man In The Middle attack?’ (Symantec Corp.), Norton Security Blog [27]; ‘What 
is UMTS?’ (Tech Target Web), Blog Post [28]; ‘Flaw in Windows DNS client exposed millions 
of users to hacking’ (SC Mag. UK), News Article [29]). Facilitated on well-known Anti-spam 
administrations content conveyance arrange (CDN), the authentications are ideally executed to 
forestall SSL/TLS compromising attacks, for example, minimize attacks (e.g. SSL stripping), 
and to guarantee compliance with most recent PCI DSS demands. Offered as a managed 
benefit, SSL/TLS arrangement is stayed up with the latest maintained by an expert security, 
both to stay aware of compliance demands and to counter emerging dangers (e.g. Heartbleed) 
(‘What is a Man In The Middle attack?’ (Symantec Corp.), Norton Security Blog [27]). Finally, 
with Antivirus dashboards, the client can likewise design HTTP Strict Transport Security 
(HSTS) arrangements to implement the utilization of SSL/TLS security over different 
subdomains. This furthers secure site and web application from convention minimize attacks 
and treat hijacking endeavours. Table-4 gives a typical review of different types of prevention 
methodologies. 
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Table-4: Various MITM prevention Mechanisms studied from literatures 
Approaches 
Detection Cryptograph
y 
Voting Hardware Other 
OSI Application BGP: (Mayer 
and Susanne, 
2014[1]; 
Hypponen and 
Keijo, 2007[2]; 
Ouafi et al., 
2008[3]; 
Callegati et al., 
2009[4]; Joshi et 
al., 2009[5]; 
Yvo Desmedt, 
2011[6]; D. 
Sounthiraraj et 
al., 2014[7]; A. 
S. Khader and D. 
Lai, 2015[8]; 
Yu-Chih Tung et 
al., 2016[9]; B. 
M. Wallace and 
J. W. Miller, 
2017[10]; M. 
Conti et al., 
2016[11]; X. Li 
et al., 2017[12]; 
R. Rahim, 
2017[13]; Yang-
Yang Fei et al., 
2018[14]; C. 
Howell et al., 
2018[15]; Da-
Zhi Sun et al., 
2018[16]; K. 
Usman et al., 
2018[17]; M. R. 
Valluri 
2018[18]; En-
Chun Kuo et al., 
2018[19]; S. Saif 
et al., 2018[20]), 
(T. Stiansen, 
2018[78]; V. 
Chaz and Kim-
Kwang 
Raymond Choo, 
2018[79]; T. 
Stiansen et al., 
2018[80]) 
DNS: (Yong 
Wan Ju et al., 
2007[71]; A. 
Chopra and 
MichaelKaufma
n, 2014[72]; T. 
Naqash et al. 
2012[73]; D. 
BGP:(A. 
Mitseva et al., 
2018[81]; 
Preneel and 
Frederik 
Vercauteren, 
2015[82]; Haya 
Shulman, 
2018[83]; M. 
Flores et al., 
2018[84]) 
DCHP: (H. H. 
Ou et al., 
2010[66]; Y. 
L. Huang et 
al., 2017[67]; 
T. Hwang and 
Prosanta 
Gope, 
2014[68]; N. 
Saxena and N. 
S. Chaudhari, 
2014 (1 & 2) 
[68 and 69]) 
DNS:(‘man-in-
the-middle-
attack’(CA.Tech.) 
[24]), (Z. Duan et 
al., 2006[55]; D. 
G. Andersen et al., 
2008[56]; 
SAMSUNG 
ELECTRONICS 
SUSTAINABILIT
Y REPORT, 
2017[57]; Z. Su et 
al.,2018[58]; N. V. 
Hardin 2018[59]; 
Su Xin et al., 
2005[62]), (M. 
Flores et al., 
2018[86]; R. 
Fernàndez-
València et al., 
2018[88]; D. 
Hanna et al., 
2018[89]) 
DCHP: (A. 
N. I. C. Ettus 
Research. 
Ettus 
research[65]; 
H. H. Ou et al. 
2010[66]; Y. 
L. Huang et 
al., 2011[67]; 
T. Hwang et 
al., 2014[68]; 
N. Saxena 
And N.S. 
Chaudhari 
2014[69]), 
(M. Xie et al., 
2018[87], A. 
Karina et al., 
2018[89]) 
BGP: (T. Naqash et 
al., 2012[73]; D. 
Kaminsky, 2008[77]; 
Y. Lindell, 2018; L. 
Xiang, 2018[86]; D. 
Zhang, 2018[113]) 
DNS: (T. Stiansen et 
al., 2018[93]; A. 
Mitseva et al., 
2018[102]; B. Preneel 
and Frederik 
Vercauteren, 
2015[106]) 
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Kaminsky, 
2008[74]; Y. 
Lindell 
2018[75]; Li 
Xiang et al., 
2018[76]; D. 
Zhang, Yuezhi 
Zhou and 
Yaoxue Zhang, 
2018[77]) 
Presentation SSL/TLS: (M. 
Ulrike and 
Susanne Wetzel, 
2004[1]; B. 
Laszlo and Kish, 
2006[2]; K. 
Hypponen and 
M. J. Haataja, 
2007[3]; K. 
Ouafi et al., 
2008[4]; F. 
Callegati et al., 
2009[5]; Y. 
Joshi et al., 
2009[6]; Yvo 
Desmedt, 
2011[7]; D. 
Sounthiraraj et 
al., 2014[8]; A. 
S. Khader and 
David Lai, 
2015[9]; Yu-
Chih Tung et al., 
2016[10]; B. M. 
Wallace and W. 
S. Miller, 
2018[11]; M. 
Conti et al., 
2016[11]; 
Xiaohong Li et 
al., 2017[12]), 
(Logan Scott, 
2001[37]) 
SSL/TLS: (B. 
M. Wallace 
and W. S. 
Miller, 
2016[33]; M. 
Conti et al., 
2016[34]; T. 
Stiansen, 
2018[35]; V. 
Chaz and 
Kim-Kwang 
Raymond 
Choo, 
2018[36]; T. 
Stiansen et al., 
2018[37]; X. 
Li et al., 
2017[39]), (A. 
Karina et al., 
2015[88]; U. 
Nath et al., 
2018[89]; M. 
S. Hossain et 
al., 2018[90]; 
D. Sinor, 
2018[91]) 
SSL/TLS: (L. 
Scott, 2001[37]; 
M. Oh et al., 
2012[39]) 
- SSL/TLS: (D. Sinor, 
2018[92]; D. 
Gunawan, 2018[93]) 
Transport - IP: (Ulrike 
Meyer and 
Susanne 
Wetzel, 
2004[1]; 
Laszlo B. 
Kish, 2006[3]; 
K. Hypponen 
and Keijo MJ 
Haataja, 
2007[4]; K. 
Ouafi et al., 
2008[5]; F. 
Callegati et 
al., 2009[6]; 
Y. Joshi et al., 
2009[7]; Yvo 
- - IP: (L. W. Huang et 
al., 2018[96]; J. L. 
Goodman et al., 
2018[97]; X. Wang et 
al., 2018[98]) 
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Desmedt, 
2011[8]; D. 
Sounthiraraj 
et al., 
2014[9]; A. S. 
Khader and 
David Lai, 
2015[10]; Yu-
Chih Tung et 
al., 2016[11]; 
B. M. Wallace 
and W. S. 
Miller, 
2016[12]; M. 
Conti et al., 
2016[13]; X. 
Li et al., 
2017[14]; R. 
Rahim, 
2017[15]; 
Yang-Yang 
Fei et al., 
2018[16]; C. 
Howell et al., 
2018[17]; Da-
Zhi Sun et al., 
2018[18]; K. 
Usman et al., 
2018[19]; M. 
R. Valluri, 
2018[20]; En-
Chun Kuo et 
al 2018[21]; 
S. Saif et al., 
2018[22]; 
‘MAN IN 
THE 
MIDDLE 
(MITM) 
ATTACK’ 
(Incapsula 
Co.)[33]; 
‘Man-in-the-
middle attack’ 
(Wikipedia); 
‘man-middle-
attack’ (CA 
Tech.)[34]), 
(M. I. 
Gramegna et 
al., 2018[94]; 
M. F. Anagreh 
et al., 
2018[95]; L. 
W. Huang et 
al., 2018[96]) 
Network - || - - || 
Data Link ARP: (H. H. Ou 
et al., 2018[60]; 
M. I. Gramegna 
ARP: (Mayer 
and Susanne, 
2014[1]; 
ARP: (Humphreys 
et al., 2008[38]; L. 
Scott, 2001[39]; S. 
ARP: (L. W. 
Huang et al. 
2018[96]; 
ARP: (Z. Duan et al., 
2006[55]; D. G. 
Andersen et al., 
AVIJIT MALLIK 
Cyberspace: Jurnal Pendidikan Teknologi Informasi  | 124 
et al., 2018[61]; 
M. F. Anagreh et 
al., 2018[62]; L. 
W. Huang et al., 
2018[63]; R. 
Rahim, 
2017[64]; Yang-
Yang Fei et al., 
2018[65]; C. 
Howell et al., 
2018[66]; Da-
Zhi Sun et al., 
2018[67]; K. 
Usman et al., 
2018[68]; M. R. 
Valluri, 
2018[69]; En-
Chun Kuo et al., 
2018[70]; S. 
Saif et al. 
2018[71]; 
‘MAN IN THE 
MIDDLE 
(MITM) 
ATTACK’ 
(Incapsula 
Co.)[72]; ‘Man-
in-the-middle 
attack’ 
(Wikipedia); 
‘man-middle-
attack’ (CA 
Tech.) [73]) 
Hypponen and 
Keijo, 
2007[2]; 
Ouafi et al., 
2008[3]; 
Callegati et 
al., 2009[4]; 
Joshi et al., 
2009[5]; Yvo 
Desmedt, 
2011[6]; D. 
Sounthiraraj 
et al., 
2014[7]; A. S. 
Khader and D. 
Lai, 2015[8]; 
Yu-Chih Tung 
et al., 
2016[9]; B. 
M. Wallace 
and J. W. 
Miller, 
2017[10]; M. 
Conti et al., 
2016[11]; X. 
Li et al., 
2017[12]; R. 
Rahim, 
2017[13]; 
Yang-Yang 
Fei et al., 
2018[14]; C. 
Howell et al., 
2018[15]; Da-
Zhi Sun et al., 
2018[16]; K. 
Usman et al., 
2018[17]; M. 
R. Valluri, 
2018[18]; En-
Chun Kuo et 
al., 2018[19]; 
S. Saif et al., 
2018[20]; T. 
Stiansen, 
2008[23]) 
A. C. Schuckers, 
2002[80]; 
Myeongjin Oh, 
2012[81]) 
Goodman et 
al., 2018[97]; 
X. Wang et al., 
2018[98]; Y. 
Li et al., 
2018[99]; D. 
MAHESWAR
I et al., 
2015[100]; 
M.Truedsson 
et al., 
2018[101]) 
2008[56]; W. 
Timmermans,2018[57
]) 
Modular 
Network
s 
GSM - (Z. Trabelsi 
and W. El-
Hajj, 
2007[78]; R. 
Philip, 
2007[79]; M. 
Oh, 2012[80]; 
T. Komori and 
T. Saito, 
2002[81]; H. 
Ju and J. Han, 
2012[82]; Z. 
Duan, X. 
Yuan, and J. 
Chandrasheka
- - - 
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r, 2006[83]; 
D. G. 
Andersen et 
al., 2005[84]), 
(M. 
Siergiejczyk 
and Adam 
Rosiński, 
2018[102]; N. 
Nayak and 
Rohit Sharma, 
2018[103]; G. 
Firdous et al., 
2018[106]) 
UMTS - (T. Stiansen, 
2018(a)[78]; C. 
Vidal and Kim-
Kwang 
Raymond 
Choo, 
2017[79];T. 
Stiansen, 
2018(b)[80]); 
(M.S. M.M. 
Jadhao et 
al.,2018[107]; 
Firdous, G. 
Shaheen, and 
R.Sandeep 
Kumar, 
2018[108]; N. 
Nayak and 
Rohit Sharma. 
2018[109]; M. 
Siergiejczyk 
and Adam 
Rosiński, 
2018[110]; M. 
Truedsson and 
Viktor Hjelm, 
2018[111]) 
- - - 
 
9. Conclusion 
The MITMs interrupt interchanges between two frameworks, and this phenomenon takes 
place when the attacker is responsible for a switch along typical point of movement. The attacker 
in all cases is situated on a similar communicated domain as the victim stands. Indeed, in a HTTP 
exchange, a TCP protocol exists among the customer and the server. The attacker divides the TCP 
protocol into two connections – one between the victim and the attacker and the other between the 
attacker and the server. On intercepting the TCP protocol, the attacker goes about as an 
intermediary reading, altering and inserting information in intercepted correspondence. In an 
unsecured connection (e.g. HTTP protocol), the communication of two users can be hacked by an 
intruder without any difficulties. In a HTTPS connection, a single TCP protocol is attained by 
building two independent SSL connections. A MITM attack exploits the shortcoming in arrange 
correspondence convention, convincing the casualty to course movement through the attacker 
instead of ordinary switch and is by and large alluded to as ARP spoofing. This unethical 
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phenomenon can affect a country’s economy and may be a reason of instability between nations 
by stealing/modifying classified/secret defence sector data/information. So, this unethical 
phenomenon has to be prevented, and the necessary measures should be taken for ending. 
Although the paper did not focus on extensive analysis for future research directions of MITM, 
but a good understanding about MITM and the technologies for preventing MITM like Li-Fi were 
discussed briefly. 
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